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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

II.

Whether Baylor stated a claim for intrusion upon seclusion against
ConDevel when its employee, Nesbit, without authorization surreptitiously installed a keylogger program on Baylor's computer, accessed corporate personnel files, and used the information for his
personal benefit.
Whether ConDevel was exempt from the disclosure requirements of
Marshall's Data Protection Act when Baylor knew about an unauthorized acquisition of computerized data, Nesbit acquired the data
to protect ConDevel's computer system, and no one outside the company accessed the information.
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OPINIONS BELOW
In case number CV-06-0326, the Grant County District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondent, ConDevel, Inc.
In case number 2006-CV-0326, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals of
the State of Marshall affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a lower court's grant of summary judgment is
de novo. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The evidence
must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Marshall R. Civ. P. 56(c).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Respondent, ConDevel, Inc. ("ConDevel"), is a leading real estate
construction and development business in Marshall. (R. at 1) ConDevel
provides its executives certain privileges or "perks" through its longstanding "VIP Program." (R. at 2) Implemented "to attract and foster
loyalty among top executives," the program is designed to allow executives to obtain memberships to a number of exclusive clubs. (R. at 2)
ConDevel awards these privileges based on an employee's rank, seniority, and salary. (R. at 2)
Petitioner, Ron Baylor ("Baylor"), is an executive vice president for
ConDevel. (R. at 2) Baylor oversees the sales, operations, and human
resources departments. (R. at 2) Consequently, Baylor can access all
ConDevel employees' electronic personnel files. (R. at 2) These files include "employee contact information, social security numbers, drivers license numbers, employee performance evaluations, employee salary
data, employee benefits information, employee awards and honors, and
other personal data." (R. at 2)
Steve Nesbit ("Nesbit") was one of Baylor's subordinates who worked
at ConDevel as a sales associate. (R. at 2) In his free time, Nesbit enjoyed many forms of high-tech entertainment and gained extensive
knowledge of computer vulnerabilities. (R. at 2) As such, Nesbit became
frustrated by what he saw as ConDevel's refusal to upgrade its technological equipment and security. (R. at 3) On several occasions, Nesbit
told his supervisor that he believed ConDevel's computer infrastructure
was vulnerable. (R. at 3) However, his supervisor told to mind his own
business and leave technological issues to the technology support department. (R. at 3)
Nevertheless, motivated by his desire to act as a team player and
problem solver, Nesbit devised a plan to raise the company's awareness
of its computer vulnerabilities. (R. at 3) Nesbit created a keylogger program, which would allow him to "discover user names, passwords, and
any other information entered via the target computer's keyboard." (R.
at 3) Nesbit planned to fully report to corporate management any documented computer vulnerabilities. (R. at 3)
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On April 25, 2005, Nesbit seized an opportunity to implement his
plan. (R. at 3) Despite ConDevel's Computer Usage Policy holding employees "responsible for safeguarding all equipment and software," (R. at
2), Baylor left his office in a hurry, leaving his computer on and unattended. (R. at 3) While Nesbit had not targeted Baylor specifically, he
installed his program on Baylor's computer. (R. at 3) Subsequently,
Nesbit received information sent to his private e-mail address via the
keylogger program, which enabled him to acquire Baylor's login and
passwords. (R. at 4) For the specific purpose of identifying ConDevel's
computer weaknesses for company management, Nesbit used this information to access the human resources database that contained employee
personnel files. (R. at 4)
After Nesbit acquired "the personally identifiable information of
every employee, including Baylor," he "had a change of heart." (R. at 4)
Being an ambitious young man, Nesbit once remarked that he "wonder[ed] if there is another way to enjoy the good life reserved to the executives." (R. at 2) Thus, when Nesbit discovered he acquired access to
business files related to the "VIP Program," he became fascinated with
the benefits and decided to use the information he obtained for his own
benefit. (R. at 4) He then downloaded the human resources files on his
home computer. (R. at 4)
Noticing Baylor had not used many of the benefits awarded to him,
Nesbit had several credentials for exclusive clubs issued to Baylor, but
sent to his own address. (R. at 4) These credentials included a membership card to the Marshall League Club ("the Club"), where Nesbit began
frequenting under Baylor's name. (R. at 4) On May 25, 2005, Nesbit
became extremely intoxicated and fought with a prominent Club member. (R. at 4) The Club's security physically removed Nesbit from the
premises and suspended Baylor's membership. (R. at 4) Subsequently,
many exclusive establishments effectively blacklisted Baylor upon learning of his suspended membership with the Club. (R. at 4)
On June 1, 2005, Baylor began to suspect that someone misused his
personal information. (R. at 4) When he took some friends to play golf,
Baylor learned that the golf club revoked his membership due to his behavior at the Club. (R. at 4) However, Baylor never joined the Club and
had not gone there in years. (R. at 4) The following week, an upscale
restaurant denied Baylor a table because of his inappropriate behavior
at the Club. (R. at 5) Following these instances, Baylor felt angry and
embarrassed. (R. at 4-5)
Baylor knew that obtaining membership cards required access to the
human resources database. (R. at 5) Thus, Baylor believed that someone posed as him and used his benefits. (R. at 5) Baylor's own investigation confirmed his belief. (R. at 5) Additionally, he discovered that
someone used his name to authorize the issuance of the cards. (R. at 5)

2008]

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

Baylor informed management and had the director of technology analyze
his computer. (R. at 5)
Through a scan of Baylor's hard drive and further analysis, ConDevel discovered Nesbit's unauthorized actions. (R. at 5) ConDevel did
not offer Baylor investigative details or to help him restore his reputation. (R. at 5) However, ConDevel immediately fired Nesbit and determined that no one outside the company accessed any personnel files. (R.
at 5) The technology support department tightened security. (R. at 5)
II.

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

On July 30, 2005, Baylor filed a complaint against ConDevel, asserting claims for intrusion upon seclusion and violation of the Marshall
Data Protection Act. (R. at 5) ConDevel moved for summary judgment
on both counts. (R. at 5) The trial court granted ConDevel's motions for
summary judgment as (1) the "State of Marshall does not recognize the
tort of intrusion upon seclusion" and (2) there was "no violation of the
notification statute." (R. at 5-6) On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
summary judgment by determining ConDevel was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. (R. at 1)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Viewed in the light most favorable to Baylor, the undisputed facts do
not raise a genuine issue of material fact that Baylor stated a claim for
intrusion upon seclusion. Nor do they show that the Marshall Data Protection Act required ConDevel to notify Baylor of Nesbit's unauthorized
acts. Therefore, ConDevel respectfully requests this Court affirm summary judgment.
This Court has not recognized the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.
However, were it an actionable tort, Baylor must prove each of the following elements: (1) ConDevel intentionally intruded or pryed into Baylor's seclusion without authorization, (2) the intrusion was highly
offensive to a reasonable person, (3) the matter intruded upon was private, and (4) the intrusion caused anguish and suffering. However, Baylor failed to prove all of the elements.
The facts indicate that ConDevel did not intentionally commit an
unauthorized intrusion as ConDevel is authorized to access its corporate
records and Baylor voluntarily supplied the information in his personnel
files. Further, Nesbit did not act as ConDevel's agent because his acts in
obtaining and subsequently using Baylor's membership cards were unauthorized and served only his personal interest. Additionally, ConDevel did not ratify Nesbit's conduct because ConDevel immediately
fired him upon learning of his actions. Thus, Nesbit acted outside the
scope of his employment, and ConDevel is not liable.
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Baylor also failed to show that the alleged intrusion was highly offensive because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy. One cannot
have a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning information obtainable via public record or related solely to a corporate interest. Baylor's
personnel file contains public record information or otherwise relates
only to his corporate interest. Thus, accessing Baylor's personnel file is
not a highly offensive intrusion.
Finally, Baylor cannot show that the alleged intrusion caused him
the requisite anguish and suffering. The facts indicate that Nesbit's
drunken altercation at the Club caused Baylor's anger and embarrassment. Thus, the alleged intrusion and Baylor's anger and embarrassment are only remotely linked.
Additionally, Baylor failed to raise a genuine issue that the Marshall
Data Protection Act required ConDevel to notify Baylor of Nesbit's actions. The undisputed facts indicate that Baylor learned of an unauthorized acquisition of computerized data before ConDevel. Therefore,
notifying Baylor of what he already knew was unnecessary.
Further, ConDevel was exempt from the notification statute, as an
employer is not required to disclose an employee's good faith acquisition
of personal information when the information was used for purposes designated by the employer "and/or" is not subject to further unauthorized
disclosure. Nesbit acquired Baylor's personal information in good faith,
as he merely wanted to show management the company's computer vulnerabilities. Nesbit used Baylor's information to obtain membership
cards. This was the designated purpose of using such information in the
"VIP Program" files. Additionally, this information is not subject to further unauthorized disclosure because ConDevel immediately took remedial actions by firing Nesbit, tightening security, and ensuring no one
outside the company accessed the information. Therefore, ConDevel respectfully requests this Court affirm summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly affirmed summary
judgment for ConDevel because no genuine issue of material fact exists
regarding Baylor's questionably actionable tort claim and the applicability of Marshall's Data Protection Act. Summary judgment is proper
when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Marshall R. Civ. P. R. 56(c);
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-323. Rule 56 mandates summary judgment
against a party who fails to sufficiently establish a required element in
his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (interpreting the federal Rule 56,
which is identical to Marshall's Rule 56). And a party is entitled to summary judgment if the applicable substantive law leads to only one rea-
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sonable verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
(1986). The undisputed facts indicate that Baylor failed to state a claim
for intrusion upon seclusion and that the narrowly tailored Marshall
Data Protection Act did not require ConDevel to notify Baylor of Nesbit's
unauthorized acts. Therefore, ConDevel respectfully requests this Court
affirm summary judgment.
I.

THE APPELLATE COURT PROPERLY AFFIRMED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE BAYLOR FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR INTRUSION
UPON SECLUSION

While privacy is a recognized human value entitled to certain legal
protections, Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Ill. 1989), no absolute
right to privacy exists. Bank of Am. v. Tremunde, 365 N.E.2d 295, 298
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977). The area of tort law known as invasion of privacy is
modeled after the late Dean Prosser's writings on four limited privacy
branches, Melvin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1012 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986),
which the Restatement (Second) of Torts formally adopted, including intrusion upon the seclusion of another. Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat.
Bank of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987, 988 (Ill. 1989). Neither this Court
nor Marshall's legislature recognizes the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.
Courts should proceed with caution in defining the right to privacy.
Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 168 N.E.2d 64, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960).
The Constitution creates "zones of privacy" through its specific provisions. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). These "zones of privacy"
protect only those personal rights that are 'fundamental' or 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty."' Id. at 713. Such personal rights involve
"matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family, relationships, and child rearing and education." Id. However, a civil action
for invasion of privacy "is not rooted in the Constitution." Lake v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. 1998) (Tomljanovich, J.,
dissenting).
Many of the states that adopted a cause of action for intrusion upon
seclusion did so legislatively. Michael S. Raum, Torts-Invasion of Privacy: North Dakota Declines to Recognize a Cause of Action for Invasion
of Privacy, 75 N.D. L. Rev. 155, 163 (1999) (observing that New York,
Virginia, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Florida, Oklahoma, and
Utah all adopted intrusion upon seclusion by statute, thus making it an
actionable tort in those jurisdictions). However, Marshall's legislature
does not recognize the tort.
Therefore, neither the Constitution nor Marshall's legislation provides a basis for recognizing the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. As it is
not a recognized action in Marshall, summary judgment in favor of ConDevel is appropriate.
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Summary judgment is appropriate also because Baylor does not
state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. An intentional intrusion,
physical or otherwise, into another's solitude or private affairs constitutes invasion of privacy only if a reasonable person would find the intrusion highly offensive. The Restatement (Second) of Torts §652(B) 377,
378 (1977). The nature of this tort therefore depends largely upon some
type of highly offensive prying. Lovgren, 534 N.E.2d at 989 (citing W.
Prosser & W. Keeton Torts §117, at 854-56 (5th ed. 1984)).
Thus, to state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, Baylor must
prove each of the following elements: (1) ConDevel intentionally intruded
or pried into Baylor's seclusion without authorization, (2) the intrusion
was highly offensive to a reasonable person, (3) the matter intruded upon
was private, and (4) the intrusion caused anguish and suffering. E.g.,
Melvin, 490 N.E.2d at 1013-14; Tremunde, 365 N.E. 2d at 297-98.1 Failure to prove any element of this questionably actionable tort terminates
the claim. Id. Baylor failed to plead facts sufficient to establish every
element of this alleged tort. Therefore, his claim must fail as a matter of
law.
A.

Baylor Failed to State a Claim Because ConDevel Did Not
Intentionally and Without Authorization Intrude or Pry into
Baylor's Seclusion

Claims for intrusion upon seclusion must fail absent proof that one
intentionally invaded another's privacy without authorization.
O'Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (3d Cir. 1989). An
employer does not commit an "unauthorized intrusion" into his employee's seclusion by disclosing information that the employee voluntarily provided to his employer. Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900,
904 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).2 Furthermore, an employer does not commit an
"intentional" intrusion upon the seclusion of another where he acts
neither individually nor through his authorized agents. New Summit
3
Assoc. Ltd. v. Nistle, 533 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
1. The Restatement's second and third elements are inter-related as one cannot claim
that an intrusion is offensive unless he has some reasonable expectation of privacy in the
area intruded upon. White v. White, 781 A.2d 85, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001). Therefore, this
brief addresses these elements concurrently.
2. While the Restatement does not define "intrusion," Webster's Dictionary defines
"intrude" as thrusting oneself in without invitation, permission, or welcome. Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary 1187 (1996). Moreover, the comments and illustrations to Restatement §652(B) indicate that intrusion-upon-seclusion claims usually involve a defendant who believes that he lacks the necessary personal permission or legal authority to do
the intrusive act. Comment (b), illustrations 1-5 (1977).
3. The Restatement (Second) of Torts §8 defines "intent" to mean that one either actually desires to cause the consequences of his act or believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from his act.
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Courts consistently refuse to extend liability to employers for their employees' intentional acts because a master is liable for acts of a servant
only when they further the employer's business interest or fall within the
scope of the employee's real or apparent authority. E.g. Bussen v. S.
Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 682 F.Supp. 319, 325 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
1.

No Unauthorized Intrusion Occurred Because ConDevel is
Authorized to Access its Business Records, Including Information
That Baylor Voluntarily Provided

An employer has the right to access and investigate its business
files. Mucklow v. John Marshall Law Sch., 531 N.E.2d 941, 946 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988). See Michael J. Leech, Hinshaw & Culberson, Federal,
State, and Common Law Privacy Issues for the ComputerAge, PLI Order
No. HO-OOLU 231, 265 (2003) (noting that an employer maintains a
compelling argument that any office search is authorized since the employer owns the property in question). No unauthorized intrusion results where an employer discloses or otherwise publishes information
voluntarily provided to it by an employee. Miller, 560 N.E.2d at 904. See
Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 876-78
(8th Cir. 2000) (observing that no unauthorized intrusion occurs where
an individual consents to an intrusive act); Samuel D. Warren and Louis
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 199-200 (1890) (acknowledging that one's right to privacy in certain information is lost
when he discloses it to others).
An employee in Miller claimed that her employer intruded upon her
seclusion when it disclosed her mastectomy surgery to co-workers after
the employer's resident nurse assured the employee that her medical information, which the employer maintained in its office, would remain
confidential. 560 N.E.2d. at 902. Because the employee voluntarily disclosed her medical procedure to her employer, the court held that the
employee failed to state a claim for unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion even though she never consented to further disclosure of her personal information. Id. at 904.
No unauthorized intrusion occurred here because ConDevel has a
right to access its personnel files, which contain personal information
that Baylor voluntarily provided. Similar to the employee in Miller, 560
N.E.2d at 902, Baylor willingly disclosed personal information to his employer, ConDevel, including his social security number, driver's license
number, etc. (R. at 2) And like the employer in Miller, 560 N.E.2d at
902, ConDevel stored and maintained Baylor's personnel records at its
place of business-more specifically, on its human resources database.
(R. at 2) Moreover, Baylor was not naive to the contents or accessibility
of personnel files, including his own at ConDevel. In fact, as executive
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vice president, Baylor supervised the human resources department,
which controlled electronic personnel files, and had direct access to all
ConDevel employees' personal information. (R. at 2) It follows logically
that Baylor, more than anyone, understood ConDevel's need to access
and update its employees' personnel files. Thus, ConDevel did not engage in an unauthorized intrusion into Baylor's seclusion because Baylor
voluntary disclosed his personal information.
2.

ConDevel Did Not Intentionally Intrude Into Baylor's Seclusion
Because Nesbit Acted Without Authorization

A claim is not actionable for intrusion upon the seclusion of another
unless the plaintiff shows an intentional intrusion. O'Donnell, 891 F.2d
at 1083; Nistle, 533 A.2d at 1354 (affirming no basis for employer liability exists in an intrusion-upon-seclusion claim absent proof that the employer intentionally participated in the alleged intrusion through his
agents or employees). Under the common-law agency doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for an employee's intentional actions
only if (a) the employee acted while furthering his employer's business
interest, (b) the employee acted within the scope of his employment, and
(c) the employer participated in, authorized, or ratified the conduct. Ex
Parte Atmore Cmty. Hosp., 719 So.2d 1190, 1194 (Ala. 1998); Jones v.
Baisch, 40 F.3d 252, 254 (8th Cir. 1994) (confirming the doctrine of respondeat superior precludes employer liability unless an employee's actions can be imputed to his employer).
Although determining whether an employee acted within the scope
of his employment is generally a question of fact, summary judgment is
appropriate if the undisputed facts lead to only one reasonable conclusion. Mason v. Kenyon Zero Storage, 856 P.2d 410, 414 (Wash. App.
1993). Here, the stipulated facts indicate that Nesbit acted only for his
personal interest without ConDevel's participation, authorization, or ratification. Accordingly, ConDevel did not intentionally intrude upon Baylor's seclusion.
i. Nesbit's Actions Served Only His Personal Interest
An employer is liable only for acts committed by an employee in furtherance of the employer's business interest. Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church, 32 F.3d 953, 959 (5th Cir. 1994). Behavior aimed primarily
at satisfying an employee's personal desires serves no business interest.
Atmore, 719 So.2d at 1194. A master is not liable when his servant steps
aside from the master's business to effectuate the servant's own purpose,
such as acts undertaken solely based on jealousy, hatred, or other ill feelings. Mason, 856 P.2d at 415.
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In Atmore, a hospital employee sued her co-worker and employer for
invasion of privacy. 719 So.2d. at 1192-93. The employee argued that
her employer was liable for a co-worker's repeated sexual harassment.
Id. Because the sole purpose of the co-worker's numerous sexual inquiries were to fulfill his own lustful desires, the court found that the employee failed to establish a basis for her employer's liability. Id. at 1194.
Conversely, in Mason, genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether a supervisor acted in furtherance of his employer's interest
when he drove a forklift into a co-worker's back. 856 P.2d at 415. The
court held that the evidence did not support the employer's assertion
that the supervisor acted out of ill-will because one could reasonably infer that the supervisor acted consistently with prior disciplinary measures effectuated on the employer's behalf. Id. Accordingly, under
Atmore and Mason, an employee acting primarily for his personal benefit, not for his employer's purpose, serves no business interest.
The stipulated facts demonstrate that Nesbit stepped aside from
ConDevel's business interest and acted out of envy for the "good life reserved to ConDevel executives." (R. at 2) Unlike Mason, where evidence
indicated that the supervisor's duties included maintaining order and
discipline within the crew, 856 P.2d at 414, here, no evidence indicates
that Nesbit's duties included maintaining or otherwise monitoring ConDevel's personnel files or executive benefits system. And in stark contrast to Mason, where evidence showed that the supervisor previously
used forklift ramming as a disciplinary tool amongst crew members, 856
P.2d at 414, here, no evidence shows that Nesbit previously used ConDevel's human resources database as a tool to perform his sales duties.
Rather, Nesbit hoped to expedite his climb up the corporate ladder by
impressing his ConDevel superiors with his initiative. (R. at 2) Hence,
Nesbit devised his calculated plan to reveal computer vulnerabilities
within ConDevel's corporate system. (R. at 4)
However, similar to the employee in Atmore, 719 So.2d at 1194, Nesbit ultimately desired to satisfy only his personal curiosities when he
downloaded ConDevel's personnel files to his home computer. (R. at 4)
Although Nesbit initially developed and installed the keylogger program
to test ConDevel's technology infrastructure and intended to report his
findings to management, (R. at 3), Nesbit admittedly "had a change of
heart." (R. at 4) As soon as Nesbit realized the extent of information he
accessed, especially ConDevel's benefits system and "VIP Program," Nesbit abandoned his original plan and usurped the information for his own
selfish designs. (R. at 4) Specifically, Nesbit obtained memberships to
various private social clubs. (R. at 4) At no point thereafter did Nesbit
raise the security inadequacies he discovered to anyone at ConDevel. (R.
at 4) Nesbit ultimately acted to enhance his own personal social circumstances rather than protect ConDevel's corporate information. Thus, no

384

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXV

rational relationship exists between Nesbit's ultimate conduct and a desire to serve ConDevel's business interests.
ii.

Nesbit Acted Outside the Scope of his Employment

No liability imputes to an employer unless the employee acted
within the scope of his individual employment. O'Bryan v. KTIV Television, 868 F.Supp. 1146, 1158 (N.D. Iowa 1994) rev'd on other grounds, 64
F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1995). An employee acts within the scope of his individual employment if his actions are so closely related to the tasks he is
hired to perform that they are methods of carrying out the employment
objectives. Atmore, 719 So.2d at 1194. See also Jones, 40 F.3d at 254
(holding that an employee acts within the scope of employment only if
his conduct occurs within the authorized time and space limits).
The court noted in Atmore that because an employee's repeated sexual inquiries and advances qualified as entirely personal in nature, they
could not fall within the scope of his assigned duties. 719 So.2d at 1194.
Likewise, in Jones, the court ruled that a physician's office could not be
held liable for acts of a nurse and her assistant when they disclosed a
patient's diagnosis to their friends. 40 F.3d at 254. The Jones court reasoned that the disclosure of the patient's medical records occurred substantially outside the work environment and without authorization from
the physician. Id. Therefore, under Atmore and Jones, an employee's
conduct related to personal matters outside the office does not fall within
the scope of employment.
Nesbit's surreptitious acquisition exceeded the scope of his employment. Analogous to Jones, where employees used a patient's medical information for personal entertainment outside the office, 40 F.3d at 253,
Nesbit used Baylor's personnel information and executive benefits for his
personal entertainment outside the office. (R. at 4) Nesbit accessed ConDevel's corporate files through his private e-mail address and had the
credentials to various social clubs sent directly to his home mailing address. (R. at 3-4) And as in Jones, where the employer never instructed
his employees to disclose the patient's information, 40 F.3d at 253-54,
ConDevel's managers never instructed Nesbit to use executive benefits.
ConDevel employed Nesbit as an entry-level sales associate. (R. at 3)
Despite his personal fascination with information technology, Nesbit had
no authority to use the computer systems he hacked. (R. at 3-4) In fact,
Nesbit's supervisor explicitly told Nesbit to "mind his own business"
when Nesbit attempted to involve himself with ConDevel's technology
infrastucture. (R. at 3)
Nesbit's sales position in no way required access to ConDevel's personnel files. Yet Nesbit collected other employees' personal information
from ConDevel's electronic database using his private e-mail address.
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(R. at 3) Nesbit then stored the information on his home computer and
had credentials sent to his home address. (R. at 4) Accordingly, Nesbitt
acted entirely outside the scope of his employment.
iii. ConDevel Did Not Participatein, Authorize, or Ratify Nesbit's
Actions
No employer liability exists for tortious conduct when the employer
neither authorizes nor tolerates a course of activity outside the employee's prescribed duties. Bussen, 682 F.Supp. at 325. An employer ratifies tortious conduct by knowing of the conduct and failing to take
adequate steps to remedy the situation. Atmore, 719 So.2d at 1195. Authorization is legitimate only if it comes from a high-level managerial
agent. Morris v. Ameritech Illinois, 785 N.E.2d 62, 71 (Ill. App. 2003).
In Bussen, a telephone company service representative accessed a
customer's billing account, which contained the customer's unlisted telephone number, in contravention of company policy. 682 F.Supp. at 32223. The customer alleged that the employee made harassing phone calls
to her home and disclosed her private number to her ex-husband, who
did the same. Id. at 323. The employer countered that its investigation
revealed no such phone calls or disclosure, but nevertheless suspended
the employee for improperly accessing the customer's file. Id. at 323-24.
The court held that even if the employee's actions constituted an invasion upon the customer's privacy, the employer is not liable because it
neither authorized nor approved the employee's conduct. Id. at 325.
Similarly, in Morris, a telephone company employee alleged that her
employer invaded her privacy when it authorized other employees to access her phone records and eavesdrop on her conversations. 785 N.E.2d
at 64. The employer argued that its managers never authorized these
actions as it maintained a strict policy of firing any employee found to
have eavesdropped. Id. at 67. The court upheld summary judgment in
favor of the employer since the employee failed to produce any evidence
that the employer's managers authorized or requested the eavesdropping. Id. at 71. Accordingly, under Bussen and Morris, an employer assumes no liability unless management participates in, authorizes, or
ratifies an employee's conduct.
Although ConDevel's Computer Usage Policy instructed employees
to safeguard their individual computers, the Policy did not instruct employees to hack into their co-worker's computers. (R. at 2) Like Morris,
where the employer never requested its employee to eavesdrop on a coworker's telephone conversations, 785 N.E.2d at 67, ConDevel never requested Nesbit to test its corporate information security or download his
co-worker's personnel files. (R. at 3) Nesbit independently took it upon
himself to test ConDevel's computer system despite direct orders from
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his supervisor to leave technological issues to the technology support department. (R. at 3) In fact, like the employer in Morris, 785 N.E.2d at
67-68, ConDevel had no knowledge that Nesbit designed the keylogger
program and secretly installed it on Baylor's computer until after Baylor
alerted ConDevel's director of technology support, who then traced the
software to Nesbit and presented his findings to management. (R. at 5)
Similar to the employer in Bussen, 682 F.Supp. at 325, ConDevel
responded immediately to Baylor's complaint with an internal investigation. (R. at 5) Finally, as in Bussen, where the employer confronted its
offending employee with proof of her wrongdoing and punished her, Id.
at 323-24, ConDevel confronted Nesbit with proof of his wrongdoing and
fired him. (R. at 5) No manager at ConDevel authorized Nesbit's keylogger program. (R. at 3) As soon as ConDevel knew of the program and
Nesbit's subsequent use of corporate records, ConDevel fired Nesbit and
tightened security. (R. at 5) Thus, ConDevel in no way participated in,
authorized, or ratified Nesbit's self-motivated actions.
Applying the stipulated facts to the relevant law leads to only one
reasonable conclusion: ConDevel did not intentionally intrude upon Baylor's seclusion because Nesbit exceeded the scope of his sales duties when
he defiantly accessed ConDevel's corporate records and used the information for personal gain. Under the well-established agency doctrine of
respondeat superior, Nesbit's actions do not impute to ConDevel. Therefore, ConDevel respectfully requests this Court affirm summary
judgment.
B.

Baylor Failed to State a Claim Because He Had No Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy, the Alleged Intrusion Was Not Highly
Offensive, and Baylor's Personnel Information Was Not
Private

The reasonable expectation of privacy represents the cornerstone of
intrusion upon seclusion, Fletcher, 220 F.3d at 877, which requires that
the intrusion be "highly offensive" to a reasonable person. White v.
White, 781 A.2d 85, 91-92 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001). Judicial determination
of offensiveness depends on one's expectation of privacy, Id. at 91-92,
which must be both subjectively held and objectively reasonable. Med.
Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., 306 F.3d 806, 812-13 (9th
Cir. 2002). When undisputed material facts demonstrate either no reasonable expectation of privacy or an insubstantial impact on an individual's privacy interest, the question of invasion is a matter of law.
Deteresa v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 121 F.3d 460, 465 (9th Cir. 1997).

2008]
1.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

Baylor Had no Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

To establish an intrusion-upon-seclusion claim, a plaintiff must
show unauthorized penetration of a surrounding physical or sensory privacy zone. Shulman v. Group W. Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998).
To that end, the Supreme Court recognized, and lower courts affirmed,
that an individual's expectation of privacy is less in commercial property
than in an individual's home. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90
(1998); Smith v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 777 F. Supp. 854, 857 (D.
Col. 1991) (holding that no unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion is implicated where the allegations involve business affairs rather than personal solitude); Morningstar v. State, 428 So.2d 220, 221 (Fla. 1983)
(finding that while a party might have an actual subjective expectation
of privacy for conversations occurring in his home, that does not mean
that society recognizes an absolute right to privacy in one's office).
One demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy through behavior consistent with actually having a privacy expectation in a specific
area. Med. Lab., 306 F.3d at 812-13. In Medical Laboratory, the plaintiffs conduct failed to demonstrate an objective privacy expectation in
certain office spaces when he provided several undercover reporters with
a tour of the company's medical lab and a conference room. Id. at 818-19.
However, stopping the reporters from entering his personal office indicated the plaintiffs privacy expectation in that specific space. Id. at 81314. Here, Baylor potentially had a subjective expectation of privacy as
he similarly did not explicitly grant Nesbit access to his business office.
However, Baylor's subjective belief that his personnel information
was private is not enough. Baylor must also have an objectively reasonable privacy expectation in the data. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490. No objectively reasonable expectation of privacy exists with respect to specific
information that one willingly shares with others. White, 781 A.2d at 92.
The nature of a work environment dictates whether an employee has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his workspace. O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718-19 (1987). To that'end, an employee cannot
objectively expect his employer not to access his office space or furniture
when the employee works in an open environment and workspace is designated for official business only. O'Bryan, 868 F.Supp. at 1159. Moreover, the absence of an official policy regulating the contents of an
employee's office and equipment does not create an expectation of privacy. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 719. See also Garrity v. John Hancock Mutual
Life Ins. Co., WL 974676 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that even in the absence of a corporate policy, employees had no reasonable privacy expectation in business e-mails sent and received over the shared computer
system owned by the employer).
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The five-judge majority in Ortega affirmed that a government employer intruded upon an employee's privacy by searching the employee's
office during his absence. 480 U.S. at 719. The Court held that the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office because of the
significant personal nature of the items found in the employee's desk and
file cabinets, which included personal medical files, financial records,
correspondence, and gifts. Id. at 718.
In stark contrast, the O'Bryan court dismissed an employee's intrusion-upon-seclusion claim against an employer who admittedly searched
its employee's workspace for corporate records. 868 F.Supp. at 1158-59.
Following the principles outlined in Ortega, the court held that the employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy because the employer
merely looked for employer-owned documents, not unrelated personal
items that belonged to the employee. Id.
The present dispute closely resembles O'Bryan and is readily distinguishable from Ortega. Unlike Ortega, where the employer's authorized
agents entered the plaintiffs locked office and searched his locked desk
and file cabinet, 480 U.S. at 718-19, ConDevel's unauthorized employee
entered Baylor's unlocked office and searched his unlocked computer.
(R. at 3) The record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that Baylor (or
any other ConDevel employee for that matter) routinely locked their offices or turned off their computers. In contrast to Ortega, where the
plaintiff stored significant quantities of personal health, financial, and
sentimental items in his office, Id., Baylor plead no facts to suggest that
he stored any personal health, financial, or sentimental items in his office. However, like O'Bryan, 868 F.Supp. at 1159, Nesbit searched ConDevel's computer system for corporate records, including those regarding
Baylor. (R. at 3-4)
ConDevel's Computer Usage Policy charged each employee with protecting the equipment and software provided by the company. (R. at 2)
Yet Baylor failed to plead facts showing that he had exclusive use or
control of his office and its contents or that he used his office computer
for personal matters. Applying the rules of law under the objective standard to the stipulated facts, Baylor had no reasonable expectation of
privacy.
2. Nesbit Did Not Commit a Highly Offensive Intrusion
In determining the offensiveness of one's conduct, courts consider
factors such as degree of intrusion; context, conduct, and circumstances
surrounding the intrusion; intruder's motives and objectives; setting intruded upon; and expectations of those whose privacy is invaded. Deteresa, 121 F.3d at 465. While determining what is highly offensive to a
reasonable person appears to suggest a jury question, a court must first
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discern a cause of action for intrusion by making a preliminary legal determination of "offensiveness." Id. at 465.
The Restatement § 652(B), Comment B, provides that a highly offensive intrusion requires an exceptional kind of prying, such as (1) taking a
photograph of a woman hospitalized due to a rare disease over her objection, (2) using a telescope to look into someone's bedroom window, or (3)
taking intimate pictures with a telescopic lens.
Building on these examples, courts have held that a film crew's taping a man's emergency medical treatment in his home and without his
consent is highly offensive. E.g. Schulman, 955 P.2d at 493. Likewise,
repeated inquiries into one's sexual proclivities, combined with numerous sexual propositions and unwanted touching, are also highly offensive. Cunningham v. Dabbs, 703. So.2d 979, 982 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
However, covertly videotaping a business conversation conducted in a
corporate office does not rise to the level of exceptional prying into another's private affairs, even where confidential business information is
discussed. Med. Lab., 306 F.3d at 819.
In Medical Laboratory, a group of undercover reporters, posing as
potential business partners, surreptitiously videotaped a private conversation with an employer's lab technician and broadcast portions of the
conversation to the general public. 306 F.3d at 814-15. The technician
argued that the broadcast was highly offensive since the conversation
included discussion of proprietary business information. Id. The court
disagreed, holding that given the conversation's inherent business nature, only de minimis intrusion resulted, which cannot qualify as highly
offensive to a reasonable person. Id. at 819-20.
Similar to the undercover reporters in Medical Laboratory, 306 F.3d
at 815, Nesbit covertly installed the keylogger program on Baylor's computer and downloaded ConDevel's business files. (R. at 3-4) However,
unlike Schulman, 955 P.2d at 490-91, and Dabbs, 703 So.2d at 982,
where the defendants' employees intruded into inherently personal affairs involving the plaintiffs' medical injuries and sexual interests, Nesbit accessed only corporate records, including Baylor's personnel file and
fringe benefits package. (R. at 4) Even though Nesbit accessed this business information without authorization, no facts indicate that Nesbit accessed or sought information related to Baylor's medical, sexual, or
family affairs. (R. at 4) Consequently, only a de minimis degree of intrusion, if any, resulted, which is not highly offensive to a reasonable person. See Med. Lab., 306 F.3d at 819 (observing that conduct resulting in
only de minimis intrusion into business matters is not highly offensive to
a reasonable person). Thus, no offensive intrusion occurred given the
inherent business nature of the information Nesbit accessed.
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Baylor's Personnel File Was Not Private

The information that courts acknowledge as private, and therefore
presenting triable issues of fact, differs substantially from the information involved in the present dispute. See Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 723
N.E.2d 1192, 1196-97 (Ill. App. 2000) (noting that courts traditionally
recognize private information as pertaining to an employee's family
problems, romantic interests, sex life, and health problems); Shulman,
955 P.2d at 491 (holding that information conveyed by a medical patient
to a paramedic during the course of emergency treatment is private); Doe
v. High-Tech Inst., 972 P.2d 1060, 1069 (Colo. App. 1998) (holding that
information derived from a patient's blood sample is private). The Supreme Court recognized "marriage" and "sexual" concerns as fundamental rights entitled to privacy protection. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
Here, however, Baylor plead no facts indicating that Nesbit (or any
other ConDevel employee) accessed information regarding his family life,
romantic interests, sex life, or health problems. Rather, Baylor's claim
concerns general identity information and information specific to his employment with ConDevel. (R. at 2, 4) Accordingly, Baylor failed to plead
sufficient facts indicating an intrusion upon private information.
i.

Baylor's General Identity Information is Readily Accessible on the
Public Record

Examination of information available at public record does not trigger an intrusion upon another's seclusion. Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 813
N.E.2d 1013, 1018 (Ill. App. 2004). Discovery of another's social security
number fails to qualify as an intrusion upon seclusion. Phillips v.
Grendahl, 312 F.3d 357, 373 (8th Cir. 2002); see also Bodah v. Lakeville
Motor Express, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Minn. App. 2002) (observing
that although social security numbers are recognized as confidential and
private, unlike medical information, they "are not on their face revealing,
compromising, or embarrassing").
In Busse, a cell-phone customer sued her phone manufacturer for
intrusion upon seclusion when the manufacturer distributed her identity
information to third parties. 813 N.E.2d at 1015. The information consisted merely of the customer's legal name, mailing address, date of
birth, and proof of marriage. Id. at 1018. The court affirmed summary
judgment for the defendant and held that such information is not private
since it is readily available on the public record. Id. In Grendahl, the
court held that although social security numbers are technically private,
because they are widely and continuously provided to others in modern
society, discovery of another's social security number does not fit the profile of intrusion upon another's seclusion. 312 F.3d at 373. Therefore,
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information that is widely disseminated or available through public record is not private.
Similar to Busse, where the personal information included names,
addresses, and social security numbers, 813 N.E.2d at 1015, here, the
personal information includes Baylor's name, address, and social security number. (R. at 2, 4) And like Grendahl,where the plaintiff voluntarily disclosed his social security number on a credit report, 312 F.3d at
372, Baylor voluntarily disclosed his social security number on his personnel record. (R. at 2) Therefore, the information regarding Baylor's
name, address, and social security number is not private information
under the intrusion-upon-seclusion tort.
ii. Baylor's Executive Profile at ConDevel Relates Only to his
CorporateInterest
Confidential information related to one's business interests and operations, as opposed to one's personal life, is not private information entitled to protection under the intrusion-upon-seclusion tort. Smith, 777
F.Supp. 854, 857 (D. Colo. 1991); Med. Lab., 306 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding that privacy is personal to individuals and does not encompass one's corporate interest).
In Medical Laboratory, the plaintiff claimed he had a privacy right
when discussing confidential business information, including operations
and testing procedures. 306 F.3d at 814. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed, holding that the plaintiff had no privacy right to proprietary corporate information because it was not personal to the plaintiff. Id.
In Smith, an employee sued for intrusion upon seclusion when her
employer contacted the employee's former supervisor to investigate the
nature and circumstances of her departure from a previous job. 777
F.Supp. at 856. The employee claimed her current employer intruded
upon her seclusion by contacting her former supervisor, who disclosed
allegedly embarrassing situations as to why the company fired her. Id.
at 856-57. Because all of the alleged intrusions involved the employee's
business affairs, the court held that the employer did not intrude into the
employee's seclusion. Id. at 857. Accordingly, the right to privacy is substantially limited when information relates solely to one's corporate
interest.
Similar to the plaintiffs in Medical Laboratory, 306 F.3d at 814, and
Smith, 777 F.Supp. at 857, Baylor's personnel information consists of official employee records and business operations. (R. at 4) Specifically,
Nesbit accessed ConDevel's human resources database, which included
the benefits system and "VIP Program" files. (R. at 4) The latter listed
exclusive social club memberships available to ConDevel executives. (R.
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at 4) Along the same lines as Smith, where the employer's manager investigated an employee's prior work history, 777 F.Supp. at 856-57, Nesbit investigated-albeit without authorization-Baylor's work profile.
(R. at 4) Nesbit at no point accessed information related to Baylor's personal affairs. Accordingly, information regarding Baylor's executive status is not private.
The undisputed material facts demonstrate that Baylor had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his personnel information, some of
which he voluntarily provided to ConDevel. Baylor also evidenced no
zone of solitude in his workspace or computer, both of which he left open
to the rest of the office. Moreover, Nesbit's conduct resulted in de minimus intrusion, if any, since Nesbit did not access information related to
Baylor's medical, sexual, or family affairs. Nesbit merely accessed information either available at public record or related to Baylor's corporate
interest. Therefore, Baylor failed to establish an intrusion upon his seclusion, and ConDevel respectfully requests this Court affirm summary
judgment.
C.

Baylor Failed to Plead the Requisite Anguish and Suffering
Because His Anger and Embarrassment Are Only Remotely
Linked to Nesbit's Alleged Intrusion

Generally, establishing causation requires sufficient facts that a defendant's conduct substantially caused the injury claimed by the plaintiff. Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 782 (5th Cir. 2000). Anyone
claiming an unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion must prove that the
alleged intrusion caused anguish and suffering. Schmidt v. Ameritech
Illinois, 786 N.E.2d 303, 315 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); Robyn v. PhillipsPetroleum, 774 F.Supp. 587, 592 (D. Colo. 1991) (confirming that the perpetrator's alleged intrusion must result in extreme mental anguish,
embarrassment, humiliation, or injury to a person of ordinary sensibilities). See PreferredNat. Ins. Co. v. Docusource, Inc., 829 A.2d 1068, 1075
(N.H. 2003) (holding that the intrusion itself must cause the requisite
harm).
Harm is not anguish and suffering when the harm is only remotely
linked to an alleged intrusion. Hoth v. Am. States Ins. Co., 735 F.Supp.
290, 293 (N.D. Ill. 1990). In order to demonstrate the requisite suffering
and anguish for intrusion upon seclusion, a plaintiff must prove actual
injury, such as a medical illness, inability to sleep or work, or a loss of
reputation and integrity in the community. Schmidt, 786 N.E.2d at 316.
But see Deteresa, 121 F.3d at 466 (holding that when an alleged privacy
invasion does not encroach upon the plaintiffs physical property, the resulting harm is de minimis and, therefore, insufficient to sustain a cause
of action for intrusion upon seclusion).
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In Hoth, an employee alleged that his employer improperly authorized a search of his office, file cabinet, and desk and collected personal
documents used as the basis of a memo accusing the employee of theft,
which eventually led to the employee's termination. 735 F.Supp. at 291.
Consequently, the employee implied that he suffered damage to his reputation based on the employer's allegations. See id. at 291 (noting employee claimed his employer made false statements in reckless disregard
of the truth). Because the underlying theft prompted the employee's termination, the court found the employer's document search only remotely
linked to the termination. Hoth, 735 F.Supp. at 293. Therefore, the
court dismissed the claim for failure to establish a sufficient causal link
between the document search and the alleged anguish and suffering. Id.
Likewise, in Schmidt, a plaintiff sued his former employer, for intruding upon his seclusion when it reviewed his personal telephone
records and then later fired the employee. 768 N.E.2d at 306. As a result, the employee claimed he suffered depression. Id. at 316. However,
the court found that the employer fired the employee for repeatedly lying
about a disability in order to get paid time off work, not because of information found in the employee's telephone records. Id. at 316-17. Therefore, an employee does not sufficiently plead anguish and suffering when
the causal connection between the alleged intrusion and resulting harm
is either attenuated or nonexistent. Id. at 317.
In stark contrast to both Schmidt, 786 N.E.2d at 316, and Hoth, 735
F.Supp. at 293, where the employers fired the employees after the disputed events, no facts suggest ConDevel fired Baylor or that Baylor otherwise left ConDevel's employment. Rather, analogous to the employee
in Hoth, Baylor implies damage to his reputation based on Nesbit's behavior while using Baylor's social club memberships. Specifically, Baylor contends that he felt anger and embarrassment on two isolated
occasions: first, when a private golf course revoked his membership and,
second, when an upscale restaurant denied him a table for dinner. (R. at
4-5)
However, under the causation rationale discussed in Schmidt and
Hoth, Baylor's supposed anger and embarrassment resulted not from
Nesbit's alleged intrusion, but from Nesbit's subsequent behavior at the
social clubs. Nesbit became intoxicated one evening and got into a fight
with another club member. (R. at 4) This altercation led to Nesbit's
physical removal from the club and subsequent cancellation of Baylor's
memberships. (R. at 4) Following this uncontested chain of events, Nesbit's installation of the keylogger program and acquisition of Baylor's
corporate records is only remotely linked to Nesbit's drunken antics,
which actually caused Baylor's anger and embarrassment. Accordingly,
Baylor failed to plead that the alleged intrusion caused the requisite
anguish and suffering.
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals properly affirmed summary
judgment because Baylor failed to state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. First, ConDevel did not intentionally authorize an intrusion into
Nesbit's seclusion because ConDevel had a right to access its business
records and Nesbit acted without authorization or ratification when he
secretly installed spyware on Baylor's computer and accessed ConDevel's
human resources database. Second, a de minimis intrusion, if any, resulted from Nesbit's actions because Baylor does not have an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in corporate records that contain information Baylor voluntarily shared with ConDevel. And third, Baylor
failed to plead the requisite anguish and suffering because Nesbit's
drunken brawl, not the alleged intrusion, caused Baylor's anger and embarrassment. Therefore, ConDevel respectfully requests this Court affirm summary judgment.
II.

THE APPELLATE COURT PROPERLY AFFIRMED THAT CONDEVEL WAS
EXEMPT FROM THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT OF MARSHALL'S

DATA PROTECTION ACT

The plain language of Marshall's Data Protection Act ("the Act") as
well as the surrounding circumstances demonstrate that ConDevel did
not violate the Act. The Act requires an agency that owns computerized
data including personal information to disclose any "breach of the security of the system," which means that the agency must disclose an "unauthorized acquisition of computerized data." 17 Marshall Code § 105(a),
(d) (2006). Here, Baylor knew of the unauthorized acquisition of computerized data before ConDevel, (R. at 5), so he already had the information
that the Act would require ConDevel to disclose. Thus, disclosure was
unnecessary.
ConDevel was also exempt under the Act's good-faith-acquisition exemption: An employee's "[g]ood faith acquisition of personal information"
is not a breach of the security of the system, "provided that the personal
information is used for the purposes designated by the agency and/or is
not subject to further unauthorized disclosure." Id. at § 105(d). Therefore, in certain situations, the Act does not require a company to disclose
an unauthorized acquisition of computerized data. This case, stemming
from Nesbit's actions, presents one of those situations. Therefore, the
4
appellate court properly affirmed summary judgment.
4. The appellate court's analysis references Baylor's argument that ConDevel violated the Act by failing to notify other employees of Nesbit's actions. (R. at 7) However,
ConDevel's decision not to notify other employees of Nesbit's actions does not make ConDevel liable to Baylor under the Act. See Sec'y of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson
Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984) (reasserting that a plaintiff does not have standing to
sue by resting his claim only on the rights or interests of others).
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Disclosure Was Unnecessary Because Baylor Already Knew the
Information that the Act Would Require ConDevel to Disclose

ConDevel was not subject to the Act's disclosure requirement because the Act requires disclosure only "following discovery or notification" of a security breach. 17 Marshall Code § 105(a). After Baylor
notified ConDevel of the unauthorized acquisition of computerized data,
disclosure was unnecessary because Baylor already knew the information that the Act would require ConDevel to disclose. See id. at § 105(a),
(d) (showing that an agency need not disclose anything more than an
unauthorized acquisition of computerized data). Therefore, the appellate
court properly affirmed summary judgment.
1.

Before Learning of Nesbit's Actions, ConDevel Did Not Owe Baylor
a Duty Under the Act

The Act's plain language imposes a duty to disclose only "following
discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data. . . ." 17
Marshall Code § 105(a). The Act does not impose a duty prior to discovery or notification. Other parts of the Act also show that an agency has a
duty only after learning of a breach. For example, the Act allows an
agency discovering or receiving notification of a breach to investigate the
matter before disclosing details: "The disclosure shall be made in the
most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent
with .. .any measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach
and restore the reasonable integrity of the data system." 17 Marshall
Code § 105(a) (emphasis added). This provision contemplates that a
company may investigate an alleged breach to determine whether it affected anyone before having to disclose it. Similarly, a data subject does
not have a cause of action under the Act unless the data collector "obfuscates evidence of a breach or makes an informed choice to not inform
data subjects of a breach." 17 Marshall Code § 105(g). This provision
shows that the agency must have at least some evidence of a breach
before a cause of action arises. Read together, these provisions show
that ConDevel did not have a duty under the Act before ConDevel
learned of Nesbit's actions. See People v. McCarty, 858 N.E.2d 15, 31 (Ill.
2006) (restating a standard rule of statutory interpretation that "provisions of a statute must be read as a whole").
2. After ConDevel Learned of Nesbit's Actions, Disclosure was
Unnecessary Because Baylor already knew of the Unauthorized
Acquisition of Computerized Data
The Act requires an agency that owns or licenses computerized data
that includes personal information to disclose any "breach of the security
of the system" to "any resident of Marshall whose unencrypted personal
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information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an
unauthorized person." 17 Marshall Code § 105(a). A "breach of the security of the system" is "unauthorized acquisition of computerized data
that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal
information maintained by the agency." Id. at § 105(d). Therefore, any
resident of Marshall who knows of an unauthorized acquisition of computerized data already has the information that the Act would require
the agency to disclose.
The stipulated facts show that Baylor knew of the unauthorized acquisition of computerized data. First, Baylor knew that someone used
his name to authorize, issue, and obtain membership cards for various
social clubs. (R. at 5) Also, Baylor knew obtaining membership cards
required access to the human resources database. (R. at 5) Accessing
the human resources database under Baylor's name required Baylor's
login and passwords. (R. at 4) Thus, Baylor knew that whoever used his
name to authorize, issue, and obtain membership cards acquired his
login and passwords to the human resources database. The record does
not indicate that Baylor authorized anyone to use his login and passwords. Consequently, Baylor knew that an unauthorized acquisition of
computerized data occurred. Therefore, he already had all the information that the Act would require ConDevel to disclose.
The Act's plain language grants ConDevel discretion in whether to
disclose additional investigative details or to assist Baylor in rebuilding
his reputation. As long as the disclosure is consistent with the Act's timing requirements, an agency complying with its own notification procedures, if any, is in compliance with the Act. 17 Marshall Code § 105(f).
Here, the record does not suggest that ConDevel ever implemented notification procedures requiring ConDevel to disclose information not otherwise subject to the Act's disclosure requirement. (R. at 2) Therefore,
ConDevel's decision not to offer investigative details or help Baylor rebuild his reputation did not violate an internal notification procedure
and, thus, did not make ConDevel liable to Baylor under the Act. (R. at
5)
Recent case law defining the scope of disclosure under a nearly identical Indiana statute confirms the validity of ConDevel's response to Nesbit's conduct. The Indiana statute requires that "after discovering or
being notified of a breach of the security of a system, the data base owner
shall disclose the breach to an Indiana resident ...." Ind. Code § 24-4.93-1 (2006). This provision requires only disclosure of a security breach
and does not require "any other affirmative act in the wake of a breach."
Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 2007 WL 2389770, at *5 (7th Cir. Aug. 23,
2007).
Disclosure requirements under a federal law as well as a nearly
identical California law show that the information Baylor already had
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nullified any need for further disclosure. The duty to disclose under the
Act is similar to a duty to disclose security breaches under the federal
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLBA"). 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2006); 70 Fed.
Reg. 15736, 15736 (March 19, 2005) (clarifying the responsibilities of financial institutions under the GLBA). The GLBA requires financial institutions to disclose security breaches to customers. 70 Fed. Reg. at
15752. The purpose of disclosure is simply to enable a customer to take
steps to prevent identity theft. Id. at 15738.
California's data protection act serves a similar purpose. As in Marshall, California requires disclosure of a "breach in the security of the
system," defined in exactly the same way as Marshall defines it: "unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security,
confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by the
agency." Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.29(a), (d) (2007); 17 Marshall Code
§ 105(d). Thus, the California and Marshall data protection acts require
agencies to disclose the same information. California's legislative analysis indicates that disclosure under the statute gives Californians "the information necessary to protect their financial wellbeing." Cal. Bill
Analysis, Assembly Bill 700, S.2001 - 2002, Reg. Sess. (Aug. 21, 2002).
Therefore, the purpose of disclosure is simply to enable data subjects to
protect their identity and financial wellbeing.
Here, Baylor knew that someone without authorization accessed his
personal information, which includes his contact information and social
security and drivers license numbers stored on ConDevel's human resources database. (R. at 2, 5) This knowledge provided Baylor the opportunity to mitigate any potential damage by requesting a fraud alert on
his credit file, obtaining copies of his credit report, scrutinizing his account statements, and taking other protective measures. See Deborah
Platt Majoras, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission,
Data Breaches and Identity Theft, 2005 WL 1432201 (June 16, 2005)
(describing basic approaches in disclosing a data breach). Under the
GLBA and California's data protection statute, which impose disclosure
requirements similar to the Act, Baylor already had information sufficient to serve the purpose of any disclosure that ConDevel could have
made. Therefore, ConDevel's decision not to disclose additional information did not harm Baylor with respect to the Act.
Baylor informed ConDevel about the unauthorized acquisition of his
computerized data. (R. at 5) This was the first time ConDevel had reason to suspect a security breach. Logically, ConDevel did not need to
"disclose" to Baylor what he already knew. Neither the Act nor ConDevel's internal procedures required disclosure of additional information. Because Baylor had enough information to serve the purpose of the
disclosure requirement, disclosure was unnecessary. Therefore, ConDevel respectfully requests this Court affirm summary judgment.
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ConDevel Was Exempt Because Nesbit in Good Faith Acquired
Baylor's Personal Information, Which Was Used for the
Purposes Designated by ConDevel "and/or" Was Not Subject
to Further Unauthorized Disclosure

A good faith acquisition is the "gaining of possession or control over
something" absent a state of mind intending fraud or seeking an unconscionable advantage. Black's Law Dictionary 25 (Bryan A. Garner ed.,
8th ed., West 2004). The undisputed facts show that Nesbit acquired
Baylor's personal information in good faith when he obtained Baylor's
login and passwords. Nesbit used the information for the purpose designated by ConDevel, and the personal information is not subject to further unauthorized disclosure. Therefore, ConDevel was exempt from the
statute's disclosure requirement, and the appellate court properly affirmed summary judgment. See Guillory v. DomtarIndus. Inc., 95 F. 3d
1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that summary judgment is appropriate where material facts concerning state of mind are undisputed).
1.

Nesbit Acquired the Personal Information When he Obtained
Baylor's Login and Passwords

The Act does not define "acquisition." Where a statute does not define a term, courts interpret the term according to its ordinary meaning.
Texas Employment Com'n v. Ben Hogan Co., 854 S.W.2d 292, 295-96
(Tex. App. 1993); McConnell v. Sutherland, 898 P.2d 254, 257 (Or. App.
1995). Dictionaries provide the ordinary meaning of terms. E.g. Texas
Employment Com'n, 854 S.W.2d at 296 (using Black's Law Dictionary to
define "acquire"); In re Marriage of Massee, 970 P.2d 1203, 1212 (Or.
1999) (using Webster's Third New Int'l. Dictionary to define
"acquisition").
"Acquisition" is the "gaining of possession or control over something." Black's Law Dictionary 25 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West
2004). This definition contemplates only the actual moment when someone gains control and does not encompass the person's subsequent actions, such as how the person uses the item gained. Thus, the moment of
acquisition occurs when someone gains possession or control over something. Under the Act, the relevant point of inquiry is the moment of acquisition because the Act exempts a company from having to disclose an
employee's "[glood faith acquisition of personal information .... ." 17
Marshall Code § 105(d). Therefore, the relevant point of inquiry is when
Nesbit gained possession or control of Baylor's personal information.
Nesbit gained possession and control of this information when he
acquired Baylor's login and passwords to access the human resources
database. (R. at 4) Acquiring a password constitutes obtaining possession and control over information protected by the password. United
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States v. Ivanov, 175 F.Supp.2d 367, 371-72 (D. Conn. 2001). In Ivanov,
the federal government charged Ivanov with illegally accessing a corporation's protected computers in furtherance of fraud and gaining something of value. Id. at 370. From his home computer in Russia, Ivanov
hacked into the corporation's computer system in the United States and
obtained key passwords. Id. at 369, 370, 372. The passwords allowed
Ivanov to copy, sell, transfer, alter, or destroy the data. Id. at 371. As
Ivanov was able to do more than access and view the data, he had control
over it. Id. He then transferred the data to a computer in Russia. Id. at
372. The court determined that Ivanov gained possession and control
over computer data the moment he obtained passwords, not when he
transferred the data. Id. at 371-72.
Therefore, Ivanov established three applicable rules. First, acquiring a password constitutes gaining possession or control over information protected by the password. Id. Second, having the ability to do more
than access and view the data equates to having control over the data.
Id. at 371. Third, gaining possession or control over protected computer
data is separate from transferring and using the data. Id. at 371-72.
Combining these rules with the plain meaning of "acquisition" shows
that Nesbit acquired Baylor's personal information when he acquired
Baylor's login and passwords. Baylor was an executive vice president
responsible for ConDevel's human resources department. (R. at 2) Accordingly, he had access to the human resources database, which includes all employees' personal information. (R. at 2) By acquiring
Baylor's login and passwords, Nesbit could do more than simply access
and view the data. For example, he was able to authorize membership
cards in Baylor's name and receive the credentials at his home. (R. at 4)
Therefore, like the defendant in Ivanov, Nesbit gained possession and
control over information protected by Baylor's login and passwords prior
to transferring the data. This constituted the "acquisition of personal
information."
As in Ivanov, Nesbit's subsequent acts-transferring the files to his
home computer and using the data to obtain memberships to exclusive
clubs-were separate from his data acquisition. (R. at 4) Whether Nebit
acted in good faith during these subsequent acts is irrelevant with respect to the Act, which exempts an agency from having to disclose an
employee's "good faith acquisition of personal information." 17 Marshall
Code § 105(d). Accordingly, the question is whether Nesbit acquired
Baylor's login and passwords in "good faith."
2. Nesbit Acquired the Login and Passwords in Good Faith
The Act does not define "good faith." As courts have used dictionaries to define "acquisition," courts have used dictionaries to define "good
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faith" when a statute does not otherwise define it. E.g., Bendiburg v.
Dempsey, 707 F.Supp. 1318, 1342 (N.D.Ga.,1989) rev'd on other grounds,
909 F.2d 463 (11th Cir. 1990); Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye and Human
Parts Bank, Inc., 519 N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). Where
"acquisition" is defined by a particular moment, "good faith" is defined by
a particular state of mind: "Absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage" constitutes good faith. Black's Law Dictionary, at
713.
The undisputed facts show that Nesbit acted in good faith when he
acquired Baylor's login and passwords because he did not intend to defraud or seek unconscionable advantage. Before he acquired Baylor's
login and passwords, Nesbit told his supervisor that he felt ConDevel's
technology infrastructure was vulnerable. (R. at 3) Nesbit wanted to
raise management's awareness of the vulnerabilities and to act as a
team player and problem solver. (R. at 4) ConDevel's Computer Usage
Policy mandated, "employees are responsible for safeguarding all equipment and software provided by the company." (R. at 3-4) However, the
Policy did not define or restrict what constituted appropriate safeguarding measures. (R. at 2) Thus, Nesbit planned to use his keylogger program to access files in the human resources database so that he could
submit a full report to management. (R. at 3) This uncontested chain of
events indicates that Nesbit did not intend to defraud or seek unconscionable advantage. Therefore, he acted in good faith at the moment of
acquisition.
Nesbit complied with the Computer Usage Policy by attempting to
safeguard ConDevel's computer system. (R. at 2) Nevertheless, Baylor
may argue that Nesbit did not act in good faith because as a salesman,
he was unauthorized to deal with technological issues. However, this
argument misconstrues the scope of the Act. The Act requires disclosure
of a security breach only under certain circumstances when an unauthorized person acquires computerized data. 17 Marshall Code § 105(a).
The Act does not require disclosure of an authorized acquisition of computerized data. The Act simply is not that broad. Under the whole-act
doctrine, courts should construe statutory provisions so as to render
them consistent with the statute's scope. MCKNIGHT V. MOUND BAYOU
PUB. SCH. DIST., 879 So.2d 493, 497-98 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). Consequently, the good-faith provision exempting a company from having to
disclose an employee's acquisition must concern an acquisition only by
an unauthorized employee. Therefore, any suggestion that Nesbit did
not act in good faith simply because he was unauthorized to acquire the
information misconstrues the scope of the Act. The Act itself contemplates that sometimes, employees, without authorization, acquire computerized data in good faith, 17 Marshall Code § 105(d), as Nesbit did
here.
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Nesbit acquired the login and passwords for the purpose of aiding
ConDevel. (R. at 4) He did not intend to defraud or seek unconscionable
advantage. Only after having acquired Baylor's personal information
did Nesbit's good faith state of mind change. (R. at 4) Nesbit's subsequent state of mind is irrelevant with respect to the plain language of the
Act. The exemption from the duty to disclose provides that "good faith
acquisition of personal information by an employee or agent of the
agency is not a breach of the security of the system . . . ." 17 Marshall
Code § 105(d). A basic rule of statutory interpretation is to interpret
terms according to their plain meanings. Gonzalez v. McNary, 980 F.2d
1418, 1420 (11th Cir. 1993). The plain meanings are dispositive unless
the legislature has clearly expressed a contrary intent. Id. The legislature defined the phrase "breach of the security of the system." 17 Marshall Code § 105(d). This shows that when the legislature intends to
define a term or phrase in a particular way, the legislature clearly expresses that intent. The legislature chose not to define "[g]ood faith acquisition." Thus, the legislature has not clearly expressed an intent that
those terms mean anything but their ordinary meaning. When Nesbit
acquired the personal information, he had only a good faith state of
mind. (R. at 4) Therefore, Nesbit acquired Baylor's personal information
in good faith.
3.

The Personal Information Was Used for the Purposes Designated
by ConDevel "and/or" is Not Subject to Further Unauthorized
Disclosure

If an employee acquires personal information in good faith, the employer is exempt from disclosing the acquisition, "provided that the personal information is used for the purposes designated by the agency
and/or is not subject to further unauthorized disclosure." 17 Marshall
Code § 105(d) (emphasis added). Therefore, an employee's good faith acquisition coupled with either the designated use of the personal information or the lack of further unauthorized disclosure, or both, exempts a
company from having to disclose the acquisition of personal information.
The "and/or" language indicates that either one, or both, is sufficient.
Nesbit used Baylor's personal information for the purpose designated by ConDevel. ConDevel designated the use of the information in
the "VIP Program" files for obtaining memberships to exclusive clubs.
(R. at 4) Nesbit accessed the "VIP Program" files and used Baylor's information to obtain memberships to exclusive clubs. (R. at 4) Nesbit did
not otherwise use Baylor's personal information. Therefore, Nesbit used
Baylor's personal information for the purpose designated by ConDevel.
That Nesbit lacked authority to use this information means only that he
was the wrong person to use it, not that he used the information for a
purpose not designated by ConDevel.
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Baylor may emphasize that the original purpose of the "VIP Program" was "to attract and foster loyalty among top executives." (R. at 2)
Thus, Baylor may conclude that since Nesbit used the information for his
personal benefit, he did not use the information "for the purposes designated by the agency." However, "designated purposes" do not include
mere incidental benefits that may flow from the use. Drager by Gutzman
v. Aluminum Indus. Corp., 495 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
For example, the ordinary designated purpose of a window screen is to
allow for ventilation and to prevent the ingress of insects. Id. Although
the window screen may also prevent people from falling out of the window, this benefit is incidental to the window screen's primary purpose.
Id. Likewise, here, the purpose for using the information in ConDevel's
"VIP Program" files is to obtain memberships to clubs. Although the
ability to obtain these memberships may attract and foster loyalty
among top executives, this benefit is incidental to the primary purpose of
using the information in the "VIP Program" files.
Thus, any suggestion that Nesbit failed to further the original purpose of the '"IP Program" misdirects the inquiry to an incidental benefit
of using the information and away from the Act's plain language, which
simply considers whether "the personal information is used for the purposes designated by the agency." 17 Marshall Code § 105(d). The legislature did not express a clear intent that this phrase means anything but
its plain meaning. See Gonzalez, 980 F.2d at 1420 (asserting that plain
meanings of statutory terms are dispositive absent clear legislative intent to the contrary). Here, ConDevel designated the use of the information in the '"IP Program" for obtaining memberships to clubs. (R. at 4)
Nesbit used Baylor's information for that purpose. (R. at 4) Therefore,
Nesbit used Baylor's personal information for the purpose designated by
ConDevel.
Moreover, Baylor's personal information is not subject to further unauthorized disclosure. As soon as ConDevel learned of Nesbit's actions,
ConDevel fired Nesbit, and the technology support department tightened
security. (R. at 5) ConDevel investigated the matter and found that no
one outside the company accessed the files. (R. at 5) These actions ensured that Baylor's personal information is not subject to further unauthorized disclosure.
Baylor may argue that the information is subject to further unauthorized disclosure because Nesbit downloaded the human resources files to
his home computer. (R. at 4) However, this argument portrays an unworkable standard for the good-faith exemption. Courts violate established principles of statutory interpretation by creating unworkable
standards. Town of Dover v. Massachusetts Water Res. Auth., 607 N.E.2d
1001, 1004 (Mass. 1993). Once a person has acquired information, that
information is almost always subject to further disclosure. The person
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might have copied the information or simply memorized it. Ensuring
that acquired information is not subject to further unauthorized disclosure by the one who acquired the information creates an unworkable
standard because the company would have to disclose even inadvertent
or harmless breaches.
This standard would render the Act inconsistent with parallel federal law. The duty to disclose under the Act is similar to a duty to disclose security breaches under the GLBA. 15 U.S.C. § 6801; 70 Fed. Reg.
at 15736. Under the GLBA, financial institutions should notify affected
customers of a security breach only after becoming aware of an incident,
conducting a reasonable investigation, and then determining the likelihood that misuse of information has occurred or is reasonably possible.
70 Fed. Reg. at 15752. Accordingly, the GLBA discourages financial institutions from notifying customers of a security breach prematurely or
unnecessarily. Id. at 15743. The concern is that notifying customers of
every possible fraud or identity theft would "needlessly alarm customers
where little likelihood of harm exists." Id. Customers should not receive
notices "that would not be useful to them" because they would eventually
regard frequent false alarms as commonplace. Id. These false alarms
would dilute the effectiveness of legitimate notices. Id.
Rather, since acquired information is always subject to further disclosure, a workable standard should require that the company take steps
to ensure that the information it possesses is not subject to further unauthorized disclosure. Here, ConDevel took those steps. As soon as ConDevel learned of Nesbit's actions, ConDevel fired Nesbit and tightened
security. (R. at 5) ConDevel investigated the matter and concluded that
no one outside the company accessed the files. (R. at 5) Thus, ConDevel
ensured that Baylor's personal information is not subject to further unauthorized disclosure.
Nesbit acquired Baylor's personal information in good faith because
he obtained Baylor's login and passwords in an attempt to help ConDevel. Nesbit used the information for the purpose designated by ConDevel, and ConDevel ensured that the information is not subject to
further unauthorized disclosure. Thus, Nesbit's actions did not constitute a "breach of the security of the system," so ConDevel did not have a
duty to disclose Nesbit's actions. Consequently, ConDevel respectfully
requests this Court affirm summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Baylor failed to state a claim, if recognized, against ConDevel for
intrusion upon seclusion. ConDevel has the right to access its business
records. The undisputed facts show that Nesbit did not act on ConDevel's behalf and ConDevel did not ratify Nesbit's actions. Further, the
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alleged intrusion was not highly offensive to a reasonable person and did
not cause Baylor the requisite anguish and suffering.
Baylor also failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on
whether ConDevel was exempt from Marshall's Data Protection Act. As
the undisputed facts show, Baylor already knew the information that the
Act would have required ConDevel to disclose, so disclosure was unnecessary. Further, ConDevel was exempt because Nesbit acquired Baylor's
personal information in good faith and used it for the purpose designated
by ConDevel, and the personal information is not subject to further unauthorized disclosure.
Because Nesbit failed to state a claim and presented no genuine issues of material fact, ConDevel respectfully requests this Court affirm
summary judgment on both claims.
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APPENDIX A:

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652(B) (1977)
§ 652(B). Intrusion Upon Seclusion
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
APPENDIX B:
17 Marshall Code § 105 (2006)
Data Protection Act, § 105 Disclosure of Breach
(a) Any agency that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information shall disclose any breach of the security of
the system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident of Marshall whose unencrypted personal
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an
unauthorized person. The disclosure shall be made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent with the
legitimate needs of law enforcement, as provided in subdivision (c), or
any measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach and restore
reasonable integrity of the data system.
(d) For purposes of this section, "breach of the security system"
means unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises
the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by the agency. Good faith acquisition of personal information by
an employee or agent of the agency is not a breach of the security of the
system, provided that the personal information is used for the purposes
designated by the agency and/or is not subject to further unauthorized
disclosure.
(f) Notwithstanding subsection (c), a data collector that maintains
its own notification procedures as part of an information security policy
for the treatment of personal information and is otherwise consistent
with the timing requirements of this Act, shall be deemed in compliance
with the notification requirements of this Section if the data collector
notifies subject persons in accordance with its policies in the event of a
breach of the security of the system data.
(g) Any and all data subjects within the State of Marshall shall have
a civil action against any data collector that obfuscates evidence of a
breach or makes an informed choice to not inform data subjects of a
breach.
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APPENDIX C:
California Civil Code § 1798.29 (West 2007)
§ 1798.29. Agencies owning, licensing, or maintaining, computerized
data including personal information; disclosure of security breach; notice
requirementsA-3
(a) Any agency that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information shall disclose any breach of the security of
the system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident of California whose unencrypted personal
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an
unauthorized person. The disclosure shall be made in the most expedient
time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement, as provided in subdivision (c), or any
measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach and restore the
reasonable integrity of the data system.
(b) Any agency that maintains computerized data that includes personal information that the agency does not own shall notify the owner or
licensee of the information of any breach of the security of the data immediately following discovery, if the personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.
(c) The notification required by this section may be delayed if a law
enforcement agency determines that the notification will impede a criminal investigation. The notification required by this section shall be made
after the law enforcement agency determines that it will not compromise
the investigation.
(d) For purposes of this section, "breach of the security of the system"
means unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises
the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by the agency. Good faith acquisition of personal information by
an employee or agent of the agency for the purposes of the agency is not a
breach of the security of the system, provided that the personal information is not used or subject to further unauthorized disclosure.
(e) For purposes of this section, "personal information" means an individual's first name or first initial and last name in combination with
any one or more of the following data elements, when either the name or
the data elements are not encrypted:
(1) Social security number.
(2) Driver's license number or California Identification Card
number.
(3) Account number, credit or debit card number, in combination
with any required security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an individual's financial account.
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(f) For purposes of this section, "personal information" does not include publicly available information that is lawfully made available to
the general public from federal, state, or local government records.
(g) For purposes of this section, "notice" may be provided by one of
the following methods.
(1) Written notice.
(2) Electronic notice, if the notice provided is consistent with the provisions regarding electronic records and signatures set forth in Section
7001 of Title 15 of the United States Code.
(3) Substitute notice, if the agency demonstrates that the cost of providing notice would exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars
($250,000), or that the affected class of subject persons to be notified exceeds 500,000, or the agency does not have sufficient contact information. Substitute notice shall consist of all of the following:
(A) E-mail notice when the agency has an e-mail address for the subject persons.
(B) Conspicuous posting of the notice on the agency's Web site page,
if the agency maintains one.
(C) Notification to major statewide media.
(h) Notwithstanding subdivision
(g), an agency that maintains its own notification procedures as part
of an information security policy for the treatment of personal information and is otherwise consistent with the timing requirements of this
part shall be deemed to be in compliance with the notification requirements of this section if it notifies subject persons in accordance with its
policies in the event of a breach of security of the system.
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APPENDIX D:
Indiana Code § 24-4.9-3-1 (West 2006)
24-4.9-3-1 Duties of data base owner
Sec. 1. (a) Except as provided in section 4(c), 4(d), and 4(e) of this
chapter, after discovering or being notified of a breach of the security of a
system, the data base owner shall disclose the breach to an Indiana resident whose:
(1) unencrypted personal information was or may have been acquired by an unauthorized person;
or
(2) encrypted personal information was or may have been acquired
by an unauthorized person with access to the encryption key; if the data
base owner knows, should know, or should have known that the unauthorized acquisition constituting the breach has resulted in or could result in identity deception (as defined in IC 35-43-5-3.5), identity theft, or
fraud affecting the Indiana resident.
(b) A data base owner required to make a disclosure under subsection (a) to more than one thousand (1,000) consumers shall also disclose
to each consumer reporting agency (as defined in 15 U.S.C. 1681a(p))
information necessary to assist the consumer reporting agency in
preventing fraud, including personal information of an Indiana resident
affected by the breach of the security of a system.
A-5

